THE COVER UP

DISSENSION IN THE STAFF

By early 1996, the outline for the regulations had taken shape, but the doubts of the Attorney General’s staff were becoming clearer and stronger.

In a memo, staffer Bill Lee voiced his doubts on several of the issues present in the current internal drafts. Mr. Lee emphasized that such action should be legislative and urged that the Attorney General’s office act only if the legislature failed to.[10] Here are key excerpts of this January 9, 1996 memo:

1.     “Saturday night specials.[11] I don’t think that we should move to ban those guns by regulation at this point. First I think the decision to ban a type of weapon outright is a legislative one.

2.     “Serial Numbers. ATF has stated in meetings that defaced serial number are not that big a problem. They have the technology to “raise” serial numbers that have been tampered with or eradicated.

3.     “Childproofing. Like the Sat. Night Special regs, these requirements seem to me to be legislative choices, at least in the first instance. Requiring higher trigger pressure, multiple motion firing mechanisms and load indicators would force a major change in the manufacturing process. Such a regulation would only hurt Massachusetts manufacturers, because out of state manufacturers would simply cease to send products to Massachusetts.

4.     “Safety warning. I think this provision should be deleted from any initiative that we undertake. A warning such as this, included with a newly purchased gun, will fall on deaf ears. Moreover, the validity of the statement regarding likelihood of homicide in a home with a gun is fiercely debated. Other language in the warning sounds overly tentative.”

In an attempt to address some of Mr. Lee’s concerns, Glenn Kaplan (another member of the Attorney General’s staff) explained that the last time the legislature had considered a ban on so-called “Saturday Night Specials” was in 1974. GOAL finds that statement to be untrue. Bills to ban all or certain classes of handguns are routinely filed in the state legislature.[12] Rather than suggest the Attorney General file legislation to ban them, Mr. Kaplan used the supposed legislative inaction as a validation for regulating them. In either case, the desired end result was clearly a gun ban, not to improve the quality of small guns, but to ban them.

Secondly, Mr. Kaplan indicated that there was plenty of data with regard to:

Once again, the cart is before the horse. The last sentence of one paragraph of this memo speaks eloquently of the backwards approach and does not begin to state how the intended regulations would prevent crime with illegal firearms or the injuries caused by these crimes. Mr. Kaplan then goes on to contradict himself:

Once again, the records show a clear and deliberate attempt to engage in a purely political endeavor against gun manufacturers. The Attorney General and his staff were planning to ban or regulate out of existence an entire “class” of guns, without even remotely knowing if they were causing any problem at all in Massachusetts.

These previously outlined facts bring us to a very important question that all Massachusetts citizens should demand an answer to: Does the Attorney General of the Commonwealth have the authority to regulate items when he has no evidence that they are a safety threat to the consumer? The evidence that GOAL uncovered suggests that the Attorney General’s own staff wanted this and other questions answered.

On April 24, 1996, Ed Cafasso, Scott Harshbarger’s Director of Communications sent a harshly worded memo to members of the Consumer Protection Division, Scott Harshbarger, and others.  The memo raises important questions which Mr. Cafasso wanted answered, and that he expected the media to raise.

“Some relevant questions regarding this ‘proposal,’ which apparently has already been shopped around:

1)    “Isn’t it true that most accidental kid deaths are the result of careless owners? This proposal does nothing in that regard. In fact, it appears to blame manufacturers entirely. How does that fit Scott’s consistent theme of individual responsibility?

2)    “The argument made by police officers for the past decade is that they are facing new, high-powered guns on the streets. That is why they have gotten rid of their old six-shot revolvers. Now we are arguing that Saturday Night Specials are the weapon of choice? How is that possible? Doesn’t that fly in the face of reality?

3)    “Is this the best that the AG has to offer? The President of NAAG[13], with an army of prosecutors and state police at his disposal, is going to try to fight violent handgun crime with a consumer regulation used against mattress discounters and careless care dealers? Why isn’t he doing something (sic) about a coordinated effort to stop the flow of guns brought up here from states with weaker handgun laws? Aren’t there more forceful and relevant things to be done?

4)    “How do we expect this regulation to accomplish anything given 1) the existing underground supply of Saturday Night Specials; 2) the fact that we don’t have the great wall of China around our state borders? 3) the fact that manufacturers can simply make a new kind of gun that skirts the regulations?; 4) the fact that criminals will simply obtain other kinds of more lethal guns that are not covered by the regulations?

5)    “How many kids were killed with Saturday night specials in Massachusetts in the past year, two years, five years? I have yet to see any compelling reason to do this. Is there one, besides the old “one life is enough argument.” If that’s our rationale, why don’t we propose regulations to correct every conceivable situation that could save one life?

6)    “How do we expect to enforce this/ will we simply add a 93A charge to anyone arrested for using a Saturday night special in commission of a crime? Do we have the staff to do it and do it right? Why would any criminal take this seriously, given the existing criminal laws? Are we just looking for headlines here?  

7)    “If we all agree with the kid-proofing and serial number ideas, why don’t we just do those instead of  with an incredible gun control over-reach?

8)    “Is it really an effective use of staff time and resources to put together a huge media event and pre-brief major dailies just so they can divert attention from the fact that much of this proposal, or at least the Saturday night special portion, is Ed

9)    wrong-headed? It’s one thing to go nuclear on something like tobacco, which needs to explained (sic) more than anything, and going nuclear on something because it is flawed.

10)“Doesn’t the fact there are this many (and probably more) legitimate questions about this proposals (sic) serve as a warning of how it will be received, no matter how much spinning we attempt to do?

11) “What precedent does this set in terms of exposing other businesses to excessive regulatory intervention?”

This blunt assessment by one of Scott Harshbarger’s key people brutally outlines the major flaws with the regulations and the Attorney General’s approach to this issue. It also spells out the truth about Mr. Harshbarger’s real agenda:

·       The regulations, as designed, cannot be an effective means of reducing crime.

·       The data does not show a specific problem with so called Saturday night specials in Massachusetts or any other problems which these regulations supposedly address.

·       Gun manufacturers cannot be responsible for individual owner carelessness.

On April 24, Mr. Lee sent around a memo to the gun “group” further expressing his doubts about the intentions and effectiveness of the proposed regulations. The first sentence indicates “I can’t make the meeting, so I am giving you some quick thoughts in writing.” It explains why this memo is dated the same day as Mr. Cafasso’s memo. In his memo Mr. Lee stated:

Clearly, the desire here is to find statistics that support their point of view, not to create regulations that will effectively solve a real problem. Once again, this is further proof that the regulations were created in the absence of supporting data. Mr. Lee further states:

ABSOLUTELY WORTHLESS

Two months later, on July 22, 1996, Ed Cafasso sent another memorandum to concerned parties in the office. From the angry tone of his memo, it appears that no one had bothered to respond to the April memo. GOAL feels it necessary to reproduce this lengthy memo in full in order to demonstrate how it truly expresses the fundamental flaws of these regulations.             

“Here is a shorter version of the questions I first posed about this idea on April 24. (for purists, a copy of the original memo is attached). Not a single one of these questions has been answered, which I assume is an indication that there are no satisfactory answers.

     “Also attached is the (June 20) question and answer memo that purports to respond [to] these concerns. As you can see, new questions were created. The answers won’t fly far. The original questions were ignored.

     “For the record, I consider the idea of banning Saturday Night Specials to be an incredible publicity stunt that will not only subject the Attorney General to unnecessary criticism (and in some cases, derisive laughter) but also prove to be absolutely worthless from a consumer protection and law enforcement perspective.

     “In the meantime, it might be nice if one of you could realistically and satisfactorily answer the kinds of questions that the Attorney General will be expected to answer once you make this mistake official.”

Questions and Answers

  1)    “Why is there absolutely nothing in this proposal that says anything about gun owner responsibility? Why are we blaming gun manufacturers for accidental deaths that are the responsibility of careless gun owners? Why are we doing this to small businesses?”

2)    “For the past decade, cops have been arguing for more firepower in the face of high-powered automatics and assault weapons. We spent the last four months trying to pass an assault weapons bill? Now, we are suddenly claiming that Saturday night specials are the weapons of choice on the streets. Who is shitting who here? Why don’t we admit this is a publicity stunt?

3)    “What reliable statistics do we have on the presence and use of these handguns in Massachusetts? Who made up the stat about 3 of 5 being submitted for forensic tests? Do we know how many of these were sold in state last year? where someone was killed with a Saturday night special? Is there any statistical basis for this proposal regulation in Massachusetts or we (sic) just interested in pursuing feel good “historic” crap now?

4)    “What about the current supply of these guns? What about the flow of these guns across state lines? If we can’t do anything about those two things, then exactly what will we have accomplished by this?

5)    “How do we expect to enforce this regulation? What will stop manufacturers from creating a new kind of cheap handgun next year? What’s the next gun we will ban?

6)     “Is this the best the Attorney General (and NAAG President) has to offer? Is the threat of a civil suit against a gun manufacturer or gun store owner really the best way to fight street crime? Why has this office done absolutely zero to control the illegal flow of weapons from states with weaker laws?

7)    “What precedent does this set in terms of exposing other legitimate businesses to excessive regulatory intervention? Why has the Attorney General been absolutely afraid to meet with gun manufacturers to discuss this idea and what might be accomplished in partnership?

8)    “Why have we not even bothered to meet with the ATF to get their input on the technical aspects of the serial number issue?

9)    “Why was the decision made to ram this ill-conceived idea through the process – actually circumvent the process – without getting any of these legitimate questions answered?

10)“How would you guys like to be Scott answering these questions at a news conference?”

Unfortunately for consumers, the media did not respond as the Attorney General’s staff had predicted. The only persons to raise these questions were Gun Owners’ Action League, and affiliated dealers. Neither the Attorney General nor his staff has ever reasonably responded to either party.

As explained earlier in this report, the process of reviewing materials is such that GOAL is looking at copies of original documents. Therefore when we request a copy of a memo, we receive a copy of a copy.

The GOAL copy of Ed Cafasso’s July 22, 1996 memo has several handwritten notes on it. Most are illegible, but they appear to be someone’s attempt to answer these questions. The responses that were given are lame at best.

·       Mr. Cafasso asked, “Why are we doing this to small businesses?” the recipient indicated “affects all equally.”

·       In response to the question “Do we know how many of these were sold in state last year?” the recipient said, “no.”

·       Regarding the questions on data (point # 3 above), the recipient cited WRISS data. However, as indicated earlier, in the report, that report might show caliber of firearms wounds, but it can not and does not distinguish between lawful and unlawful gun ownership and use. A woman defending herself from rape, and a drive-by shooting would be treated equally in the WRISS data.

·       Regarding the current supply of these guns, the recipient noted, “37% of firearms found in a study 1991-1994 were sold interstate.” In fact, federal studies show that Massachusetts might be a recipient of traffic in stolen guns, but it is not considered a “supply state.” The idea that the regulations might choke lawful traffic into Massachusetts, but would not touch the problem of unlawful traffic seems to have been ignored by the AG’s staff.

·       A footnote on question seven indicates that the Attorney General’s staff met in three instances with the manufacturers. The record indicates otherwise. There is no record of any meetings after the 1994 meeting with the New England Attorneys General. The talk at that meeting was how manufacturers could keep “guns off the streets” and not the issues of duplicate serial numbers, safety devices, trigger pulls, magazine disconnects or any other topics. Indeed, in April of 1996, Mr. Lee indicated that no meetings had taken place since 1994.

The bottom line is that Mr. Cafasso’s assumption is correct. Not a single one of these questions was ever completely answered, nor was there ever an honest attempt to do so. This is yet another indication that there are no satisfactory answers.

THE SHELL GAME

One of the most frustrating aspects of the creation and implementation of the regulations has been the vagueness of the focus. The regulations were advertised as a means to prevent crime or accidents. The Attorney General’s staff has been very adept at switching back and forth between the two topics.

To justify these “consumer product safety” regulations, the public hearing had a long parade of crime victims. When someone raised a question about accidents, the answer was given about how the guns were used in crime. When someone raised a question about crimes, the response was a fact about accident statistics. The truth is, neither the Attorney General nor his staff had accurate data to justify the regulations, but they successfully switched topics often enough to even confuse their own people as to the intentions.

For example, Mr. Cafasso was cited earlier in this report as having grave doubts about the lack of supporting data. He felt so strongly about this topic that he sent an email (July 23) to “Tom”. Ed wrote:

“I appreciate your views and look forward to getting this resolved. My main concern at this point is that we do not have enough empirical or statistical evidence regarding Saturday night specials in MASSACHUSETTS.

“We cannot tell anyone how many we think are available here, how many are sold legally or illegally each year, how many are used in the commission of crimes in Massachusetts, how many have blown up in someone’s hands, etc.

“If we could just nail down some factual support for a ban – beyond general national numbers ginned up by gun control types – it would be a lot easier to swallow and a lot easier to sell.

“That was the strongpoint of the tobacco launch. We were able to say how many people in Massachusetts die each year, how may people in Massachusetts get addicted, how much money we spend. It gave the suit instant credibility.

“Right now, all Scott will be able to say in defense of a ban is that “these guns are generally thought to maybe be poorly made and are used in a lot of crimes in Massachusetts, we think.

“Can’t we use our friends in the law enforcement field to come up with some fairly hard facts on these guns and their role in Massachusetts. My fear is that we will spend the next three months on the defensive, scrambling to answer legitimate questions.[15]”

Once again, the data was never found. The Attorney General announced the regulation just a couple of weeks later. Ed Cafasso’s email was “responded” to by George Weber. I use the word in quotes because most of Ed’s questions were deflected, not answered.

No scholar of logic would consider the above statement to be an answer to Mr. Cafasso’s questions.

There has been no attempt on the part of the AG’s office to determine whether so-called Saturday Night Specials are disproportionately represented in crime, that is, to compare the numbers manufactured with the numbers that end up being used in crime. Knowing that the ATF chooses which guns to trace, they can therefore skew the statistics by choosing to trace only “Saturday Night Specials.” There is also no attempt to figure out how these guns are getting into the black market, that is, how to prevent their unlawful use. Nor is there an attempt to weigh how these guns might be used lawfully with how these guns are used in crimes.

One of the only pieces of data that has shown up in our investigation is the production figures from certain companies, which are unfortunately unrelated to the crime and safety efforts purported to be underway. It appears that even though this data is factually unrelated to the issues at hand, Mr. Weber appears to be stretching the only data available to him to fit his purpose.

In June 1997, Glenn Kaplan sent a memo to George Weber regarding the 1995 handgun production figures that had just been released by the ATF. In the memo Mr. Kaplan divided the production figures into three categories: Ring of Fire, Gun Valley and Whole Industry. The records reflected that the 1993 production figures for the so-called “Ring of Fire” companies were less than 900,000 for 1993, 892,000 to be precise. But in 1995, two years later, the production had dropped substantially, to 233,000. Those numbers represented a 73% drop in production. If these numbers actually had any relevance to the issues of safety and crime, then the Attorney General’s office should have been able to produce corresponding data showing a drop in crime and accidents by 73%.

Even though the Attorney General’s own staff knew the alleged problem did not exist and that the fictitious correlation between handgun manufacturing and public safety hazards could no longer be supported, the regulations were still put forth. What a public relations ploy, with crime and accidents steadily declining they could claim the drop was due to the regulations.

We have also examined some drafts of Attorney General Harshbarger’s initial speech, delivered in July 1996, announcing the regulations. A careful look at the text of the speech shows the shell game continued.

It appears that part of the shell game was to lull the media and the public into believing only a few guns would be targeted. As usual, the sound bite sounds plausible and even reasonable to some, but once questions are raised about the issue, the veil of deception is lifted. Regardless of how it sounded, the authority granted to the Attorney General to regulate business practices does not grant him any special powers to regulate product manufacture, or violent crime.

The authority to regulate product manufacture, in general, is granted to the Federal Consumer Product Safety Commission and covers “unfair and deceptive business practices”, not perceived accident prevention and crime reduction. In general, our state expects rules regarding criminal justice to come from the Executive Office of Public Safety or originate from the legislature, not the Attorney General’s office. The Attorney General’s position is that of the chief prosecutor of our state. Specifically that he prosecutes the laws created by our legislative process, not those made by his thirst for political attention.

Catch phrases such as “tamper proof serial numbers” might lead someone to believe that the Attorney General was not aware that federal regulations already require serial numbers on guns, or that it was already illegal under state and federal law to remove them.

“Equipped with childproofing features” is another unique catch phrase. Even though the Attorney General had already announced the regulations, the compliance requirements were not yet spelled out. The draft speech said:

The term “might include” once again demonstrates the Attorney General’s lack of knowledge of the subject and the reasons for the industry’s inability to ready themselves for compliance. The regulations, as proposed, would have required that all handguns sold have (1) a safety mechanism such as a trigger lock, or solenoid or trigger handle locks (2) a mechanism which effectively precludes a child under age six from operating the weapon and (3) a load indicator device.

The final paragraph of the proposed speech is seemingly and specifically designed as a cover, aimed at misinforming the public. With such a presentation, the Attorney General presents the citizens with a facade of mutual cooperation and benefit, neither of which actually took place because of his unwillingness to answer questions and work together with industry.

Yet just a few months after the final draft of the regulations, the American Shooting Sports Council filed suit against the Attorney General. Their Executive Director, Richard Feldman, stated:

SAFETY & CRIME WERE NEVER THE ISSUE

As of the summer of 1996, the regulations had been announced, but not yet published in The Massachusetts Register. With the hearing scheduled for November, on August 14, Ed Cafasso wrote to George Weber and Tom Green:

But as has been already demonstrated in this report, the data on these guns is not available. In another memo from Glen Kaplan to George Weber, Mr. Kaplan stated:

What is significant about this memo is that once again, the alleged purpose of the regulations is only to ban specific brands, not improve the quality of manufacturing or decrease accident rates. The intent to ban just a few guns is confirmed by the draft speech, which states that:

However, the current effect of the regulations has been much broader, as many precision quality gun manufacturers are unable to sell their product to properly licensed citizens in the Commonwealth – and neither the past nor present Attorney General has ever attempted to change the regulations. Literally hundreds of models are not eligible for private sale in Massachusetts at this time, including those used everyday by law enforcement and military personnel.

This raises some disturbing questions. Either the Attorney General’s staff were incapable of drafting a regulation that effectively accomplished the advertised objective or their target was indeed much wider, a first of its kind handgun ban that successfully avoided the legislative process.

Further proof that the ban is wide of the mark is contained in a November 15, memo from Glenn Kaplan to George Weber:

So we have in writing, the Attorney General’s staff stating their goal is to eliminate certain cheaply made guns, and further that the materials test will accomplish that goal. So why were the extra modifications – the loaded chamber indicator and the magazine disconnect – required? Simply put, these requirements can only have been put in place to create the illusion of scientific solutions and to ensure that most of the existing (including precision grade) firearms could not be sold.

With the information provided to us, or the lack thereof, it is evident the intent of the Attorney General was to take the matter out of the hands of the professionals, the people, and the legislature and simply ban handguns through a regulatory fiat.

THE COVER UP TAKES SHAPE

As preparations for the hearings began, the scramble for data continued. Frantic hand scribbled memos appear as part of the official records, now, with long lists of people to call. Several drafts of the hearing schedule appear, packed with victims of crime. The scramble for hard data to back up the facts seems to be reaching a fevered pitch. Even as the Attorney General was boasting about how he was leading the nation in a solution for handgun violence and safety, his staff was struggling to try and figure out if the alleged guns to be banned were a problem in Massachusetts.

On September 19, 1996, Robert Sikellis, Chief of the Narcotics and Special Investigations Division submitted a report to George Weber, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division. The report states, in pertinent part,

But Glenn Kaplan didn’t take no for an answer. He wrote to George Weber and others regarding the memo. Here is how Mr. Kaplan interpreted Mr. Sikellis’ memo:

Why was there a discrepancy between “no guns” and “4 definite and 3 possible”? A careful review of the list shows a lot of misspellings, and no pattern of  “Saturday Night Specials.”  Cross referencing the list of targeted manufacturers Mr. Kaplan himself generated a month prior, there are only three guns – out of 57 - on this list (made by Davis Industries). It is clear now that the Attorney General’s office was redefining and stretching the supporting data to meet their personal agenda.

Perhaps the blatant arrogance of the staff in proceeding to regulate a non-existent problem – and one for which they had no data - is best demonstrated in a memo on October 17, 1996, one month before the public hearings. Glenn Kaplan writes to George Weber:

Mr. Kaplan goes on to suggest that the Attorney General hire HP White Laboratories to prepare a report for $2000, and to hire Whit Collins to fly out and spend a few days doing research and responding to any “false or misleading statements” for approximately $6000 in costs.

Once again the staff is proving that there is no strong factual basis to the advertised need for the regulations.

After the public hearing, there is a flurry of activity required under the Administrative Procedures Act. The number of memos in the files drops off, and the pace slackens. In fact, the final version of the regulations would not be made public until June of 1997, over 7 months later.

Four months after the public hearing, the staff is still trying to justify a ban on guns. The records show that Glenn Kaplan sent a memo to George Weber to ask for money to conduct tests.

SECTION 3:

SUMMATION

THE PROBLEMS WITH THE REGULATIONS

In this section we will try to explain a few of the specific reasons why the regulations are so difficult to understand and the facts that lead to their having such a harsh effect. Our focus will be on the practical, that is the aspects of the regulations that are confusing and unworkable. It is our contention that the present Attorney General and his staff knew, were advised, and should have known of these problems, and it is only politics, pride or perhaps the true purpose that prevents correction of these many problems.

Here are just a few of the problems in implementation of the regulations:

·       The regulations use the term handgun purveyor to mean both manufacturer and dealer. There is no reason that dealers should be placing serial numbers on firearms, or that they should be responsible for their placement, or know where the hidden location is. Dealers should not be responsible for matters pertaining to the manufacturing process, but should only be given specific and clear directives on what can and can not be done on their tier of the industry.

·       The exceptions for sales to law enforcement or sales of “target guns”, are placed in the definition of handgun purveyor. This puts a dealer in a catch 22 -- he is a handgun purveyor because he sells more than four guns a year and is properly licensed to do so, but the term does not apply if he’s selling a gun to law enforcement or when selling a target gun. And if the dealer is not a handgun purveyor when selling duty guns to law enforcement or selling a target gun, may he then forgo the written warning and the description of the safety features?  If the gun had less than a three inch barrel, would the firing test still be required?

·       The term target guns is not defined. Though fifteen months have passed, the most popular Sturm, Ruger .22 caliber target pistol has yet to receive “approval” as a target pistol. We have also heard that the Attorney General refused to approve the less expensive models of Smith & Wesson target guns unless they had added a huge uncomfortable grip, something that discriminates against women or other persons with smaller hands.

It is worth noting that if a gun is manufactured, there is most likely a competition for which it is used. That is, every kind of gun could be conceived of as a target gun, as there are competitions for accuracy involving .45 caliber guns, as well as .22 caliber guns. In addition, many beginning pistol competitors start out with less expensive .22’s, and proceed to more conventional target style pistols as they acquire expertise and confidence. The exception for target pistols is impracticably not aimed at their intended use, but at the type of gun instead.

·       Despite numerous requests, we do not know of a single manufacturer that has received written confirmation that any of their firearms comply with the regulations.

·       The regulations require a “loaded chamber indicator” or “magazine safety disconnect.” Both are controversial features. The records show that the Attorney General received advice in 1997 against “magazine safety disconnects”, but point out that a loaded chamber indicator is a horse of a different color.

A loaded chamber indicator is typically a hole drilled into the chamber where a cartridge sits when the gun is ready to be fired.  One AG staffer suggested it was like a “clearly marked on/off switch on a child’s toy”, but that is a completely inaccurate and possibly dangerous description. If one were to review the physical process by which a primer is ignited, powder is burned, and the resultant gases drive the projectile, a more accurate analogy would be to compare a loaded chamber indicator to a hole drilled into a piston’s chamber in an internal combustion engine to observe that ignition is indeed taking place. While loaded chamber indicators are used in some firearms, they should be done so very cautiously, and never simply by the demands of an unqualified politician. 

·       Single shot handguns cannot be sold unless they devise some way to safely install a loaded chamber indicator.

·       In order to sell a new or used handgun with a barrel length of less than three inches, a handgun purveyor is expected to provide factual data on the limits of its accuracy, that is the average group diameter test result at 14 yards and at 21 yards. That means in order to sell guns, the dealer must now have access to a firing range. To emphasize the impracticality of the regulation, consider a firearm which was sold in 1997, but never fired. The dealer must now fire it – and dramatically decrease its financial value.

·       The Educational Collector exemption is poorly designed, referring to someone who is “properly licensed as a bona fide collector pursuant to 520 CMR 7.00.”  That regulation is for a person applying for a license to possess fully automatic guns (referred to by some as select-fire guns). 

This puts a dealer in a bad position when the used gun to be sold is not intended to be fired. Picture a collector whose passion is derringers from the 1800’s. If the collector does not also have a machine gun license, the dealer must fire the handgun and provide the average group diameter test result. The results of which can vary greatly depending upon the ability of the shooter, type of firing vise used, and even the type and grade of ammunition used.

·       Unlike state law, the definition of handgun does not appear to exempt out primitive, or “black powder” firearms.

All of the questions raised by these regulations might indeed be explainable if the Attorney General had the desire to do so. Many dealers have called the Attorney General’s office when they had questions as to whether a specific model was compliant with the regulations. They quickly learned that such an approach is fruitless.

That office’s standard reply in 1996 was “call your lawyer.”

Unfortunately, the attitude has not changed with the current administration. In the spring of 2001, the aide to one state senator, calling to ask what one portion of the regulations meant, was also told to “consult a lawyer.” As it turns out, the aide is a lawyer.

We are not aware of any other agency of government telling a citizen who seeks to comply with the Commonwealth’s regulations to “call their la